It is well-known that the problem of recognizing an ESS in a symmetric bimatrix game is coNPcomplete. In this paper, we show that recognizing an ESS even in doubly symmetric bimatrix games is also coNP-complete. Our result further implies that recognizing asymptotically stable equilibria of the replicator dynamic in this class of games is also a coNP-complete problem. It is also known that a strategy in a doubly symmetric bimatrix game is an ESS if and only if it is locally strictly efficient, that is, if it is a strict local maximum of a corresponding standard quadratic program. Since the latter problem is NP-hard it follows that NP = coNP.
Introduction
The theory of evolution, as that was formulated by Darwin, has had a profound impact in the sciences, not only in biology but also in the social sciences and economics. From a mathematical perspective, evolutionary theory relies on the framework of noncooperative games. From such an analytical perspective, evolutionary theory can be approached either from the perspective of notions of evolutionary stability Price, 1973, Maynard Smith, 1982] or that of evolutionary dynamics (such as the replicator dynamic of Taylor and Jonker [1978] ).
In this paper, we examine theories of evolution from a computational complexity perspective. Etessami and Lochbihler [2008] and Nisan [2006] have cast doubt that the notion of evolutionary stability can serve as a general foundation of evolutionary theories unless P = NP, by showing that the problem of recognizing an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is coNP-complete. This result applies to the general class of symmetric bimatrix games.
Restricting the problem to the class of doubly symmetric (coordination) games (that is, symmetric bimatrix games where the payoff matrix is symmetric), one would perhaps expect that such a detection problem becomes computationally tractable as coordination games were recently strongly tied to Darwin's theory of evolution: Chastain et al. [2014] view evolution as a coordination game solved by a multiplicative weights algorithm akin to the replicator dynamic (cf. [Arora et al., 2012] ) (see also [Mehta et al., 2015] ). Alas, we show that the problem remains coNP-complete even in symmetric coordination games. Since a strategy in such a coordination game is an ESS if and only it is asymptotically stable under the replicator dynamic [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988] , the problem of detecting asymptotically stable equilibria of the replicator dynamic is also coNP-complete.
It is also known that a strategy in a doubly symmetric bimatrix game is an ESS if and only if it is locally strictly efficient [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988 ] (see also [Weibull, 1995, pp. 56-57] ), that is, if it is a strict local maximum of a corresponding standard quadratic program. Since the problem of recognizing a strict local maximum in this class of programs is NP-hard [Horst et al., 1995] (see also Schnitger, 1988, Bomze, 1998 ]) it follows that NP = coNP.
The ESS is a refinement of the symmetric Nash equilibrium in symmetric bimatrix games. Let us, therefore, start off by introducing game-theoretic concepts in this setting.
Nash equilibria
A 2-player (bimatrix) game in normal form is specified by a pair of n × m matrices A and B, the former corresponding to the row player and the latter to the column player. If B = A T , where A T is the transpose of A, the game is called symmetric. A mixed strategy for the row player is a probability vector P ∈ R n and a mixed strategy for the column player is a probability vector Q ∈ R m . The payoff to the row player of P against Q is P · AQ and that to the column player is P ·BQ. Let us denote the space of probability vectors for the row player by P and the corresponding space for the column player by Q. A Nash equilibrium of a 2-player game (A, B) is a pair of mixed strategies P * and Q * such that all unilateral deviations from these strategies are not profitable, that is, for all P ∈ P and Q ∈ Q, we simultaneously have that
Observe that if the bimatrix game is symmetric, the second inequality is redundant. Let (C, C T ) be a symmetric bimatrix game. If C is a symmetric matrix (that is, if C T = C), (C, C T ) is called a doubly symmetric game or a coordination game. We are going to denote symmetric payoff matrices by S. We call a Nash equilibrium strategy, say P * , symmetric, if (P * , P * ) is an equilibrium, in which case we call the equilibrium (P * , P * ) a symmetric equilibrium.
Evolutionary stability
We are now ready to give the formal definition of an ESS.
Definition 1. Let (C, C T ) be a symmetric bimatrix game. We say that X * ∈ X is an ESS, if
Here X is the space of mixed strategies of (C, C T ) (a simplex in R n where n is the number of pure strategies) and O is a neighborhood of X * .
We note that an ESS is necessarily an isolated symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy in the sense that no other symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy exists in a neighborhood of an ESS. We have the following characterization of an ESS in doubly symmetric (coordination) games. Let f : X → R where X is a subset of R n . Recall that X * ∈ X is a strict local maximum of f if there exists a neighborhood O of X * such that, for all
Theorem 1. X * is an ESS of (S, S) if and only if X * is a strict local maximum of the standard quadratic program
where X is the simplex of mixed strategies of (S, S).
Theorem 1 is implicit in the literature as it amounts to a characterization of evolutionary stability based on the well-known notion of strict local efficiency (cf. [Weibull, 1995, p. 56 
]).
We have the following characterization of an ESS. Lemma 1. X * is an ESS of (C, C T ) if and only if it is a strict local maximum of
where X is the simplex in R n and n is the size of C.
Proof. Straightforward from the definition of an ESS, and the elementary observations that
As a consequence of Lemma 1 we obtain the following immediate fact.
Lemma 2. The problem of detecting a strict local maximum of a standard quadratic program is coNP-hard.
Proof. Etessami and Lochbihler [2008] and Nisan [2006] show that the problem of detecting an ESS is coNP-complete. Since (3) can be readily brought into the form of a standard quadratic program (cf. [Bomze, 1998] ), the problem of detecting an ESS is a special case of the problem of detecting a strict local maximum of a standard quadratic program in light of Lemma 1.
Theorem 2. The problem of detecting an ESS in a doubly symmetric bimatrix game is coNPcomplete.
Proof. In light of Lemma 2 and Theorem 1, it suffices to show that the problem of detecting an ESS in a doubly symmetric bimatrix game is in coNP. But this is a simple implication of the simple fact that this class of games is not but a subset of the class of symmetric bimatrix games.
Theorem 2 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The problem of detecting an asymptotically stable equilibrium point of the continuoustime replicator dynamic in a doubly symmetric game is coNP-complete.
Proof. In doubly symmetric bimatrix games, the notions of asymptotic stability under the replicator dynamic and that of evolutionary stability coincide [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988] .
Note that the question of detecting asymptotically stable equilibria of the replicator dynamic in a doubly symmetric game reduces to the question of finding the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the vector field on the right-hand-side of the differential equation that gives the replicator dynamic:
where n is the number of pure strategies (which can be easily verified to be symmetric, cf. [Sandholm, 2010, Section 8.5 .1]) unless the Jacobian is negative semidefinite and singular, in which case such a test is inconclusive. But the set of singular symmetric matrices is not but a null-set. We may now state our main result.
Theorem 3. NP = coNP.
Proof. The problem of detecting a strict local maximum of a quadratic program is NP-hard [Pardalos and Schnitger, 1988] even in standard quadratic programs [Bomze, 1998 , Horst et al., 1995 . The theorem then follows by Theorems 1 and 2.
